This article argues that regional access to justice in West Africa provides an alternative to national access to justice through the institution of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. This gives West Africans the option of pursuing justice in national judicial institutions or in the ECOWAS Court. Therefore, it reveals a situation where both systems compete for effectiveness in meeting the justice demands of citizens while also encouraging greater complementarity in their institutional activities.
Introduction
The importance of institution-building in post-independence and post-Cold War Africa, as in most epoch-turning societies, cannot be overemphasized. In the wake of global, regional and national transformations, African countries have striven to develop political -as well as social, cultural, and economicinstitutions that will stand the test of time. The goal has been to build institutions that will be effective, institutions that will result in the implementation of government policy to meet the demands of citizens.1 However, effectiveness has not always been the outcome, and the civil and political conflicts that have beset many countries on the continent have been manifestations of this failure of institutions. Ndulo notes that the post-colonisation environment in Africa was one that came with constraints, such as "underdeveloped human resources, political fragility and insecurity rooted in poorly structured institutions".2 These institutional defects lie at the foundation of the continent's socio-economic and political challenges and continue to influence (under)development trends in African countries.3 The World Bank noted in 1989 that, In many African countries the administrations, judiciaries, and educational institutions are now mere shadows of their former selves. This wide-spread institutional decay is symbolized by the poor physical condition of once world-class institutions . . . by the break-down of judicial systems in a number of countries, by the poor state of once high-quality roads, and by the dilapidation of once well-functioning rail-ways.4
'Justice' as a product of functional judicial institutions can be seen as a public good, like roads and railways, which is to be provided for citizens by the government.5 However, significant challenges in governance in African countries have meant that the State has been unable to provide justice or to even run functional judicial systems, owing mostly to social and political decay and instability.6 In a country like the Gambia, it has been noted that the judicial system "suffers from neglect, under-investment, and a severe lack of resources and infrastructure, resulting from a general deprioritisation of its importance" and that the "actions [of the Gambian government] undermined judicial independence and the rule of law".7 In Nigeria, citizens have sought justice in foreign courts in civil and criminal matters, sometimes after a failed resort to the domestic justice system.8 Consequently, judicial reform, which is perhaps one of the most basic means of promoting access to justice, has become a significant part of the discourse on development and governance in Africa as will be shown below.
In theory, "equal justice under law" is difficult to oppose. In practice, however, it begins to unravel at key points, beginning with what we mean by "justice." In most discussions, "equal justice" implies equal access to the justice system. The underlying assumption is that social justice is available through procedural justice.9 5 Deborah Rhodes notes that 'law is a public good' . See D. Rhodes, 'Access to Justice ' , 69 Fordham Law Review (2001) , 1785-1821, at p. 1795. 6 Adebajo notes that in some West African countries, the security apparatus, including justice institutions, has been run as the personal preserve of the rulers. See A. Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2002) , p. 70, where he states, for instance, that "Liberia's security forces have historically served as an instrument of partisan rule, first defending the interests of Americo-Liberian oligarchy, then keeping the autocratic regime of Doe in power, and . . . attempting to ensure the survival of Taylor's regime . . . the dispensation of justice is not perceived as neutral".
International Bar Association, Under Pressure: A Report on the Rule of Law in the Gambia
(International Bar Association, London, 2006), pp. 5-6, available online at http://www .ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=214e3622-85cf-4219-a151-4194a506a204 (accessed 28 October 2013). 8 See, for instance, Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004 , concerning a civil action brought by igerians in the US against an American company for acts that occurred in Nigeria; Queen v. James Onanefe Ibori (Case No. T20117192), Southwark Crown Court, 17 April 2012, concerning a criminal action brought against a former Nigerian governor for crimes connected to corruption charges that had been brought against him and dismissed in a Nigerian court ; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013 , concerning a civil action brought by Nigerians against a Dutch company for acts that occurred in Nigeria. 9 D.L. Rhodes, Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2004) , p. 5.
Rhode speaks of access to a 'justice system' , implying that this system exists and functions, at whatever level. Access to justice measures are, therefore, those measures that are meant to provide citizens with admission to a 'functioning' justice system and to address specific structural and substantive challenges. Hence, where individuals and groups such as the poor or marginalized have restricted access to the system, this becomes an issue for the State to address. 10 The institutions that exist to meet citizens' demands may not necessarily always exist at the level of the nation-state. Although international organisations were introduced to regulate international activity on an international plane that consisted mainly of States as the predominant actors, in recent times, these organisations have extended their reach to involve non-State actors and regulate the affairs and activities of such actors.11 This has meant that international organisations not only regulate the affairs of States but may also complement the work/activities of States by dealing directly with non-State actors such as individuals.12 The past half-century has seen the establishment and evolution of international parliaments, executive institutions, and judiciaries, in the different regions of the world. This phenomenon in Africa is of particular importance because of the rising questionability of State effectiveness and the clamour for intervention in different spheres of State responsibility.13 In
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World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1989), p. 192 , where the Bank noted that rehabilitation of judicial systems was necessary for political renewal, which would restore confidence in government institutions and economic processes; See also V. Maru, 'Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice' , World Bank Justice and Development Working Paper Series, volume 9 (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009 ). 11
The regulation of state activity is based on the idea that states are the predominant subjects of international law. Therefore, as subjects of international law, these organisations, formed by states, have a prima facie state-centric focus. However, this is not the full story, as discussions about the growing scope of subjects of international law grow. See, for instance, G. For instance, Schreuer notes that "The traditional exclusion of non-State actors from the international arena has been subjected to a number of important exceptions and limitations in the course of this century." See C.H. Schreuer, 'Concurrent Jurisdiction of National and International Tribunals ' , 13 Houston Law Review (1975 -1976 In his discussion of state failure, Kreijen notes that the phenomenon is common throughout the African sub-continent. He goes on to describe it as "the absence of meaningful governmental structures within the state." See G. Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty, and: response to global, regional and national vicissitudes, African governments have become members of and established global, regional and national institutions. The interactions between and among such institutions are important, not only for resolving disputes and ensuring synergies but, more importantly, for ensuring that the demands of citizens (be they national, regional or global) are met;14 in other words, institution-building is on-going at different levels of political organization. This article will assess one of the institutions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Court of Justice, and see how it has evolved and been shaped to meet citizens' demands at the regional level. It will also seek to address the question whether regional integration -and in essence, supra-national institutions -can be used to address national challenges in a way that meets the demands of citizens. The paper will argue that the ECOWAS Court was established to address national challenges in justice sector performance and, in a sense, act as an alternative to failing institutions in Member States. The article will argue that regional integration in the African context can -and should -be used to address national institutional deficits, while also contributing to the development of stronger national institutions. The focus of this work is the interpretation of relevant ecowas instruments in determining how the ecowas Court relates with Member State judicial systems, and not vice versa. In other words, this paper does not look at the ways in which national courts relate with the ecowas Court.
The first part of the article will discuss the experience of regional integration in West Africa, with an aim to addressing concerns about the performance of institutions in West African States and the introduction of a regional response. The second part of the paper will provide a detailed explanation of the establishment, functions, and competence of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. The third part will examine the relationship between national and international tribunals, and it will argue that, unlike most other international tribunals, the ECOWAS Court operates on the same plane as national courts in Member States and provides an alternative for citizens in search of greater effectiveness in justice delivery. In other words, there is a system of competing competences, allowing citizens to choose where to make their demands. West African States have worked to address their institutional deficits and promote economic growth and development. One of the ways they have done this is through regional integration. Although concrete discussions about regional integration in Africa began at the start of the 20th century, the real returns were not realized until about half a century later.16 The next halfcentury saw a proliferation of regional and sub-regional institutions on the continent, and today, there are more regional institutions in Africa than any other region in the world. The continent is a 'spaghetti bowl' of regional organisations, many of which have overlapping membership and obligations.17 In this regard, West Africa is a microcosm of the African condition, with several intergovernmental organizations in a region with fewer than twenty countries.18
The principles and institutions of the Community was expanded to address social and political concerns, in addition to the economic concerns of the 1970s. Since then, regional integration in West Africa has progressively addressed broad development and institution-building goals, particularly through the establishment of institutions for the regulation of integration and promotion of development in the Community. Furthermore, in 2006, the administration of the Community was transformed to "endow the Community with greater supranational powers".26 The idea was to facilitate a transition from 'an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people' , in an effort to achieve real institutional effectiveness and achieve the goals of integration.27
These changes in the regional integration goals and practices of ECOWAS also touched on the 'judicial system' of the Community, as Therefore, democracy and good governance demand a properly functioning judicial system that meets the demands of citizens. In West Africa, one of the ways in which the challenges of access to justice and judicial institutions were addressed was through regional integration and the introduction of regional judicial institutions. As Nwauche notes,
Regional human rights protection is often a reaction against the failings of nation states operating on the assumption that the pooled resources of a regional understanding will overcome the weakness of national human rights systems. It is often thought that states with a weak human rights system will change their systems to accord with higher regional normative standards.30
This logic is analogical to the establishment of regional institutions in Africa.
We will now discuss the experience of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice as a regional judicial system that promotes institutional effectiveness at the state and supra-state levels. The 1993 Revised Treaty was adopted shortly after the 1991 Protocol on the Court came into force. This Treaty provides for the establishment of a Community Court of Justice in Articles 6 and 15. The functions and competence of the Court remained the same during the first decade of the Protocol coming into force. However, in the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,36 a provision reviewing the 1991 Protocol extended the competence of the Court to cover actions involving the violation of human rights and the exhaustion of local remedies rule was introduced for such actions brought before the Court. The relevant provision states that Protocol A/P.1/7/91 adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991 relating to the Community Court of Justice, shall be reviewed so as to give the Court the power to hear, inter-alia, cases relating to violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national level have failed.
This provision was relative to the 1991 Protocol, under which, as noted above, individuals were not competent to bring actions before the Court. Therefore, the 2001 Protocol modified the functions and competence of the Court to include the power to determine cases involving the violation of human rights. When read in line with the provisions of Article 9 on the competence of the Court, this additional power of the Court can be interpreted to cover only those human rights actions brought by member States on behalf of their citizens. The introduction of this modification could be attributed to the inclusion of Article 4(g) in the 1993 Revised Treaty, which provides that Member States affirm and declare their adherence to the principle of "recognition promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights", a provision that was not present in the 1975 Treaty. This provision, as will be shown below, is a significant part of the jurisprudence of the Court in determining its human rights jurisdiction.
Again, in 2005, a Supplementary Protocol to the 1991 Protocol37 was adopted, and it contained provisions that extended the competence of the Court as well as the rules relating to access to the Court. Article 3 substituted the old Article 9 with a new one that deals with the 'Jurisdiction of the Court' , which, Article 3 provides for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court to include: "[t]he interpretation and application of the Treaty, Convention and Protocols of the Community; the interpretation and application of the regulations, directives, decisions, and other subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS; the legality of regulations, directives, decisions and legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS; the failure by Member States to honor their obligations under the Treaty, Convention and Protocols, regulations, directives, or decisions of ECOWAS; the provisions of the Treaty, Convention and Protocols, regulations, directives, or decisions of ECOWAS Member States; the Community and its officials; the action for damages against a Community institution or an official of the Community for any action or omission in the exercise of official functions; . . . the power to determine any contractual liability of the Community and . . . order the Community to pay damages or make reparation for any acts or omissions of any Community institution or Community officials in the performance of official duties or functions; . . . the jurisdiction to determine cases of violations of human rights that occur in any Member State; . . . the power to act as arbitrator for the purpose of Article 16 of the Treaty; jurisdiction over any matter provided for in an agreement where the parties provide that the Court shall settle disputes arising from the agreement; . . . the powers conferred upon it by the provisions of this Protocol as well as any other powers that may be conferred by subsequent Protocols and Decisions of the Community" The new Article 9(8) grants the Authority of Heads of State and Government "the power to grant the Court the power to adjudicate on any specific dispute that it may refer to the Court other than those specified in this Article".
and institutions become pertinent, especially as the Protocol does not make expansive reference to such a relationship, not even with regard to the exhaustion of local remedies.39 Although the Protocol and the Supplementary Protocol are almost silent with regard to the relationship between the Court and national institutions,40 the Court has developed an impressive jurisprudence with regard to the issue. The following section will provide a brief analysis of the relationship between international tribunals and domestic courts, then it will look at the developing body of case law on the relationship between the ECOWAS Court and the courts of Member states; then, it will attempt to situate the ECOWAS experience within the general discourse.
4
Competing Competences in Adjudication?
Some General Rules on Jurisdictional Relations between National
and International Courts Domestic tribunals should be the first port of call for private individuals and juristic persons seeking justice in the form of rights protection, dispute resolution, or other kinds of legal matters. However, with the rise in the number of international tribunals, it has become possible, and in many cases desirable,41 for natural and juristic persons to settle their disputes or seek the protection 39 As will be seen below, the Court is silent on the question of exhaustion of local remedies, which is recognized in most international human rights instruments that grant individuals access to international courts and tribunals. International tribunals operate on a horizontal plane in which there is no hierarchy to determine their relationship with one another; therefore, the proliferation of such institutions raises questions about the resolution of contradictions between judgments and awards, as the case may be, as well as the need to institutionalize the relations between these tribunals.46 This is a very interesting phenomenon that continues to receive widespread attention, as it provides an interesting dimension to the quest for mandatory or vertical enforcement mechanisms under international law. Somewhat related to this phenomenon is the similarly -perhaps even more -troublesome question of the relationship between international tribunals and domestic tribunals. Although there is no universally accepted position on the nature of the relationship between international law and municipal law, it is suggested that both operate on different spheres.47 This makes it easier to regulate the relationship between international and domestic tribunals, as many treaties establishing international tribunals or governing international jurisdiction will usually contain some reference to the position of domestic courts, as will be shown below.
There are several rules that determine the relationship between tribunals, and, in its discussion of the relationship between national and international institutions, this article will focus on some jurisdiction-regulating rules that determine access to such institutions by disputing parties.48 The main focus of this paper will be the exhaustion of local remedies rule, which is a rule of admissibility and a principle of customary international law that has been employed significantly by international human rights tribunals and provides a prima facie interpretation of the relationship between domestic and international tribunals. Where there is an application of the local remedies rule, other jurisdiction-regulating rules may not apply, because of the automatic presumption of a hierarchical relationship between the courts or institutions in question. This will be discussed further below. With regard to the spheres of jurisdiction of national courts and international courts, there is a much less acknowledged confirmation of distinction, as both spheres overlap in different areas of jurisdiction.49 However, such overlap may be regulated by the existence of a jurisdictional hierarchy in the relations between those courts (something that does not necessarily exist in say the relations between international tribunals inter se).50 Where such a hierarchy does not exist, we can assume that there will be a horizontal relationship between the different systems, national and international (somewhat similar to what exists between international tribunals inter se). The hierarchical vertical relationship may promote the supremacy of the international tribunal or the national tribunal, while a non-hierarchical horizontal relationship would usually promote a system of alternatives in which parties can choose between competing systems. The recognition of hierarchy itself presents a "jurisdictionregulating regime", according to Shany, and "the establishment of hierarchical relations negates the possibility of viewing parallel proceedings as judicial alternatives to one another".51 Therefore, where there is a hierarchical relationship between such institutions, they cannot compete with each other as 48 In his study of the relations between national and international relations, Shany looks at treaty-based jurisdiction regulating rules such as the exhaustion of local remedies, the preliminary ruling rule, the doctrine of complimentarity, electa una via, and the recognition of international arbitral awards. He notes that while the first two indicate a vertical hierarchical relationship between national and international institutions, the last three represent horizontal non-hierarchical relations between the parties. See Shany, supra note 47. 49
See Shany, supra note 47; Shany, supra note 44, p. 10. 50
See Shany, supra note 47, p. 6. 51
Ibid., p. 88. However, this rule is not in itself exhaustive as it can lead to challenges of coordination such as the parallel litigation of identical courses and consequent logistical, financial and resource-based complications. Therefore, other jurisdiction-regulating rules (for example, the exhaustion of local remedies rule or preliminary ruling) would usually be employed in a hierarchical situation to deal with such issues. Ibid.
the relationship would usually involve power relations requiring the review of one system by another.52 A non-hierarchical relationship reveals competition, alternatives and dialogue.53 As noted earlier, relevant constitutive treaties usually define the relationship between national and international tribunals, and here, rules such as the exhaustion of local remedies,54 preliminary ruling, the doctrine of complimentarity, electa una via, and the recognition of international arbitral awards may come into play. Where the treaty does not provide for an express jurisdictionregulating rule, the court may determine how to handle the complexities of jurisdictional overlaps.55
The legal instrument conferring jurisdiction is usually the first place to look in determining the existence of a jurisdiction-regulating rule, which might reveal a hierarchical or non-hierarchical relationship between the different courts capable of exercising jurisdiction. In Electricity Company of Sofia,56 the PCIJ had to decide whether an action brought before it by Belgium, on behalf of a Belgian company, against Bulgaria, during the pendency of a suit in the Bulgarian Court of Cassation, was 'premature and irregular' . The Court took into consideration the content of the relevant treaty between the parties granting it jurisdiction, noting that
The local remedies rule contemplated by the Treaty of 1931 implies the exhaustion of all appeals, including appeals to the Court of Cassation, a decision by which alone renders the judgment final either by annulling the judgment of the Court of Appeal and sending the case back for a retrial, or by rejecting the appeal.57 Therefore, where the appeal was pending at the time of institution of the international case, but was determined shortly thereafter, the Courts decided, based on the special circumstances of that case, that the application was irregular. As indicated in the Sofia judgment, the Court will always look at the treaty(ies) and instrument(s) governing jurisdiction in any matter, affirming the "treatybased, category-specific nature of the jurisdiction of most international tribunals".59 In some situations, as will be shown below, these treaty provisions may require the exhaustion of local remedies. Therefore, rules relating to the exhaustion of local or other legal remedies are usually based on treaty provisions that ensure that the parties exhaust other (national) avenues for the resolution of their dispute before approaching the international tribunals.
The agreement between the parties granting jurisdiction to the Court is an important determinant of the effect of pending or parallel litigation, as it is a signifier of the relationships between different tribunals seized with jurisdiction over similar matters, in other words, overlapping or competing jurisdiction. We will now look briefly at some jurisdiction-regulating rules.
4.2
Exhaustion of Local Remedies The rule relating to the exhaustion of local remedies, referred to above, has been recognized as a rule of customary international law, which requires parties to exhaust local remedies in actions against other state parties before exercising the diplomatic protection of their nationals in international tribunals. As opposed to being a rule of jurisdiction, this is a rule of admissibility that determines whether or not the Court will entertain a particular suit, based on the procedural validity of the application. The application of the rule has been extended to cases involving individuals and states in international tribunals. international tribunals and municipal courts is usually determined by the treaties that constitute such tribunals, and will usually contain a provision on the necessity of the exhaustion of local remedies. Although these international tribunals are concerned with the international obligation of states to protect human rights (which is governed by international law under the relevant treaties), many of the rights contained in the international human rights instruments also cover domestic obligations of state parties. Therefore, there are important linkages between both court systems, which would usually require domestic tribunals to handle cases of human rights violations similar to the actions that may be brought before international tribunals. Domestic courts, under this rule, are expected to handle such cases before they are brought before international tribunals by dissatisfied parties, thus ensuring that state parties have the opportunity to govern their domestic affairs before such matters are brought before an international tribunal. In SERAC V. Nigeria,61 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights noted that
One purpose of the exhaustion of local remedies requirement is to give the domestic courts an opportunity to decide upon cases before they are brought to the international forum, thus avoiding contradictory judgments of law at the national and international levels.
Again, in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe v. Zimbabwe,62 the African Commission stated that
International mechanisms are not substitutes for domestic implementation of human rights, but should be seen as tools to assist the domestic authorities to develop a sufficient protection of human rights in their territories. If a victim of a human rights violation wants to bring an individual case before an international body, he or she must first have tried to obtain a remedy from the national authorities. It must be shown that the state was given an opportunity to remedy the case itself before resorting to an international body. This reflects the fact that states are not considered to have violated their human rights obligations if they provide genuine and effective remedies for the victims of human rights violations.
The application of this rule can be interpreted as recognition of the sovereign power of states to handle their domestic affairs, espoused in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and an expression of the doctrine of comity.63 It also has the operational function of controlling the multiplicity of same or similar proceedings in national and international tribunals, which could lead to ' divergent conclusions' .64 In addition to these functions, the exhaustion of local remedies rule, as noted in the Zimbabwe case, gives States the opportunity to comply with their international obligation before subsequent review of (non)-compliance is brought before an international tribunal or institution. Many of the instruments governing international human rights tribunals contain a provision requiring the prior exhaustion of local remedies before cases are brought before such tribunals.65 It is these instruments that define the jurisdiction of the relevant tribunals, amongst other things; therefore, where such explicitly stated requirements are not met, the tribunal will refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. This rule creates a hierarchical relationship between international tribunals and domestic tribunals so that the international tribunal, which hears a case after it must have gone through a domestic process, usually has a power of review over the domestic process.66
From the above, it is clear that international and domestic tribunals operate on different spheres, but there may be linkages in their jurisdiction based on the parties or the cause of action. While rules such as res judicata and lis alibi pendens may not necessarily apply in the regulation of jurisdiction in vertical hierarchical relations, the treaties or other legal instruments establishing the international tribunal will usually contain the rule relating to the exhaustion of local remedies, which then acts as a jurisdiction-regulating rule. In the absence of such a provision, the Court may have to rely on other jurisdiction-regulating rules to determine its competence to hear a matter involving a domestic court.
4.3
Jurisdictional Relations between the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice and National Courts As noted above, there is no rule on the exhaustion of local remedies in the Protocols relating to the ECOWAS Court. Nevertheless, the Court has had to . . . the combined effect of article 9(4) of the Protocol of the Court, as amended, article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty and . . . the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is that the plaintiff must invoke the Court's jurisdiction by (i) establishing that there is a right recognized by . . . the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights; (ii) that this right has been violated by the defendant; (iii) that there is no action pending before another international Court in respect of the alleged breach of his right; and (iv) that there was no previously laid down law that led to the alleged breach of abuse of his rights.70
From the above, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Court will not be restricted by judicial or other proceedings pending in domestic courts or institutions of Member States. This confirms that the exhaustion of local remedies rule is not a compulsory jurisdiction-regulating rule in resolving competing jurisdictional claims between domestic and international tribunals, but rather, that its omission can signify the definition of the relationship between such tribunals. Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is recognized as a rule of customary international law, its original application applied mainly to the original reference to diplomatic protection. Amerasinghe notes that 67 The latter is an expression of the electa una via rule, which is a non-hierarchical horizontal jurisdiction-regulating rule. The systematic protection of the national against his own state . . . can only be based on a broader acceptance of substantive rules and principles relating to human rights which apparently are only coming to be recognized, if at all, in customary international law. In any case, the remedies for the protection of human rights as such come through the medium of conventions and agreements. The implementation of protection remedially can only be determined by the provisions of such instruments, since there is no procedure at customary or general international law to secure the implementation of such protection, particularly against national states of the injured individual. Thus, at present it is to the instruments by which such protection is implemented that resort must be had in order to discover whether and to what extent the rule of local remedies is applicable to the scheme of such protection.71
Therefore, the application of such jurisdiction-regulating rules, in the case of international protection of human rights, is usually restricted to the provisions of the treaty or agreement granting jurisdiction, the content of which are imperative to the interpretation of the jurisdiction of international tribunals. In this regard, the relevant documents for the interpretation of the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS . . . as regards material competence, the applicable texts are those produced by the Community for the needs of its functioning towards economic integration: the Revised Treaty, the Protocols, Conventions, and subsidiary legal instruments adopted by the highest authorities of ECOWAS. It is therefore the non-observance of these texts which justifies and founds the legal proceedings brought before the Court. From this standpoint, the Court has to determine the extent to which the Application instituting proceedings makes a demand on any Community text.
In addition, the omission of the local remedies rule in the relevant texts of the Community Court can only be regarded as intentional. Before the expansion of access to the Court to include applications by individuals, the Community leadership had thought it fit to adopt the rule relating to the exhaustion of local remedies under the 2001 Supplementary Protocol. This was an expression of the rule in its original historical context, which is in the area of diplomatic protection. . Such an intention may, however, be exhibited by express provisions which are at variance with the continued operation of the relevant principle of international law." Therefore, according to Loewen, in the absence of express words precluding the application of the local remedies rule, the rule would be applicable in international actions. This position seems to make the rule a rule of customary international law that is binding on relevant actors, a conclusion which is not exactly tenable. International institutions may introduce jurisdiction-regulating rules in their relations with national and other international institutions, but this does not give them the power to introduce universal rules binding on all such relations. said article refers not to any organization but the Commission. Consequently that provision of article 50 cannot be applied stricto senso to this case pertaining to the exhaustion of local remedy and its relevance to this Court", and the Court stated further that "it is trite that competence of the Court is enshrined in articles 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Protocol".79
The local remedies rule depicts that international human rights tribunals are meant to play a somewhat supervisory role in the protection of human rights and to intervene where the domestic courts have refused or failed to protect the rights in question. It implies powers of review over the decisions of domestic courts and institutions, almost like an appellate court. Although judicial review can be interpreted from a relationship of unidirectional bindingness, Shany notes that while hierarchy usually empowers a court to exercise judicial review over another, judicial review in itself is not necessarily a sine qua non for ascertaining inter-fora hierarchy.80 The ECOWAS court has also attempted to describe its relationship with domestic courts in this regard. In Ugokwe v. Nigeria and Others,81 the Court categorically stated that Appealing against the decision of the National Court of Member States does not form part of the powers of the court; the distinctive feature of the Community legal order of ECOWAS is that it sets forth a judicial monism of first and last resort in Community Law. And, if the obligation to implement the decision of the Community Court of Justice lies with the national courts of Member States, the kind of relationship existing between the Community Court and these national courts of Member States, but demands an integrated legal order. The ECOWAS Court of Justice is not a Court of Appeal or a Court of cassation . . . as to the orders being sought against the execution of the judgement already made by the Federal Appeal Court of the Member State of Nigeria -the Court is incompetent.82
In Keita,83 the Court noted that it would not have the power to deliberate on the decisions of national courts. Therefore it does not have powers of review. The Court said that Based on the above decisions, it is clear that the Court does not see itself as a review or supervisory mechanism for decisions coming from national courts. Having established that the local remedies rule will not apply in the ECOWAS Court, which also does not have a power of judicial review over national courts, we must determine the nature of the relationship between the Court and domestic courts. We must determine whether it is a hierarchical or non-hierarchical relationship in order to determine the types of jurisdictionregulating rules that will apply in such relations. Shany recognizes two hierarchy signifiers, viz, permissible multiplicity and unidirectional bindingness. He claims that where it is permissible to commence multiple proceedings before different courts and the decisions of one court are binding on another, then we have a system of hierarchy. Conversely, where it is not permissible to commence multiple proceedings before different courts, this is a non-hierarchy signifier.85 There is nothing in any of the jurisdiction-regulating instruments mentioned above that permits or precludes multiplicity of proceedings between the ECOWAS Court and national courts, although Article 22(2) of the 1991 Protocol may be interpreted -very broadlyto partially preclude multiple proceedings. That provision states that 84 Koraou, supra note 76, para. 91. 85
Shany, supra note 47, p. 87. Here, Shany notes that the electa una via rule and the doctrine of complimentarity are non-hierarchy signifiers.
When a dispute is brought before the Court, Member States or Institutions of the Community shall refrain from any action likely to aggravate or militate against its settlement.
Under desperate circumstances, this provision may be interpreted as precluding courts in Member States from entertaining matters that have been brought before the Court. This might seem an extreme interpretation of the provision, since it does not preclude parallel attempts at settling the dispute, but rather prevents actions that would aggravate the dispute or militate against settlement. In addition, as will be noted below, the international obligation of States does not bind their courts directly, so such a provision that places obligation on 'Member States' does not place any direct obligation on their courts. Therefore, the interpretation of the existence of this requirement will depend on the Court's interpretation of the relevant instruments in determining its relationship with Member State courts and vice versa. So far, the ECOWAS Court has not attempted any such broad interpretation. In Koraou, the respondent State raised a preliminary objection on the admissibility of the application before the Court on the ground that domestic proceedings were still pending. The Court held, in response, that Consequently, by providing for article 10(d)(ii) of the Supplementary Protocol in the manner it did, the Community lawmaker of ECOWAS intended to remain within the strict confines of what international practice has deemed appropriate to abide by. It is therefore not the duty of the instant Court to add to the Supplementary Protocol conditions which have not been provided for by the texts. Ultimately, and for all these reasons, the objection raised by the defendant cannot thrive.
Therefore, by restricting itself to a strict and somewhat inflexible interpretation of the jurisdiction-conferring instruments, the Court appears to favor an interpretation that permits multiplicity of proceedings. Based on the above, the requirement of unidirectional bindingness appears to be absent in the relationship between the Court and the courts of Member States, thus signifying a non-hierarchical relationship. However, Shany also notes that a significant non-hierarchy signifier is the prohibition or preclusion of multiple proceedings, which is absent from the Court's relationship with national courts. Therefore, the ECOWAS Court, in its relationship with national courts, seems to exist somewhere between hierarchy and non-hierarchy in a realm of vertico-horizontal relations. This relationship also falls within Ahdieh's concept of dialectic review, under which "neither court can impose its will on the other, producing a degree of incident autonomy within an overall pattern of systemic dependence".95
4.5
Competing Competences: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Competition exists under the following situations: where there is a nonhierarchical relationship between the institutions in question; where there are jurisdictional overlaps; and where parties may choose one or both of the judicial options available for the settlement of their disputes. Where, as Shany notes, the judicial systems exist as alternatives to one another, there is the possibility -the likelihood -of competition. Citizens may then choose, depending on their perception of which system offers better access to justice, which of the alternative institutions to lay their claim.
Based on the above, the non-bindingness of the Court's decisions on national courts -and vice versa -indicates something of a horizontal nonhierarchical relationship between the Court and national courts. It is argued that, by extension, this relationship is of a somewhat vertico-horizontal nature, requiring the Court to determine cases based on the relevant Community texts, but also taking into consideration the level of autonomy which State courts have in response to its decisions. This was the case in Ugokwe, where significant outcry in Nigerian public circles led the Court to reconsider and reverse its preliminary decision that amounted to a review of a national court decision.96 Therefore, the autonomy of the Court is restricted by the influence of autonomous national courts on the recognition and implementation of its decisions. Nevertheless, based on Community texts and the jurisprudence of the Court, the relationship between the Court and national courts is nonhierarchical. The nature of this relationship fulfills the first requirement for competition. The Court's human rights jurisdiction, which is based on the provisions of the African Charter, covers rights that are protected under the constitutional bill of rights of Member States; therefore, the possibility of jurisdictional overlap in human rights actions is very high, thus fulfilling the second requirement for competition.
We can safely assume that the ECOWAS Court provides an alternative for disputants to choose between the Court and national courts, neither of which exercises a supervisory role over the other, since both institutions exist in a space that allows for multiplicity of proceedings. Thus, litigants can bring their action in their national court or the ECOWAS court or in both courts simultaneously.
The fact that parties may choose between bringing an action in the domestic court and in the ECOWAS Court or do both -signifying alternatives -reveals a horizontal relationship between both systems, but because of the possibility of multiple proceedings and the influence of the Court's decisions on national courts through the binding nature of international obligations on state organs, there is a somewhat vertical twist to this relationship.97 Therefore, the relationship between the Court and national courts can be regarded as both vertical and horizontal, in that it contains important elements of international judicial power by which the Court can bind Member State institutions, which may in turn influence national courts; in addition, it contains the practical hierarchy signifier of permissibility of multiple proceedings.98 In essence, permissible multiple proceedings and the resultant challenges that come with that necessitate the introduction of jurisdiction-regulating rules to address such challenges.
The relevant Community texts and the jurisprudence of the Court do not provide clear jurisdiction-regulating rules to define and govern its relationship with national courts, and, as can be seen from the above examples, the Court 97
As Shany notes that "hierarchical relations negate the possibility of viewing parallel proceedings as judicial alternatives to one another", it can safely be assumed that nonhierarchical relations provide this possibility. Shany, supra note 47, p. 88. 98
Ahdieh's dialectical review reveals an 'equipoise of power' in which international judicial power based on non-voluntary access is balanced by national autonomy. See Ahdieh, supra note 52, p. 2090.
has been reluctant to make direct pronouncements on the application of relevant jurisdiction-regulating rules, whether this means applying recognized rules or introducing new ones.99 This means that there is still ample room for the Court to introduce the application of rules that will strike a balance between access to justice and judicial regulation in defining its relationship with national courts in Member States. In summary, rather than act as a supervisory mechanism, the Court exists as an alternative judicial system for citizens, resulting in competition between institutions.100 This way, citizens have direct access to judicial institutions at the national and regional level, that are capable of protecting their nationally and internationally guaranteed rights. Thus, what we have in the case of the ECOWAS Court is a system of competing competencies, such that the competence -or lack thereof -of the domestic system determines recourse to the international (regional) system.
Considering the institutional challenges experienced by Member States, the situation of competing competences is a welcome interpretation of the jurisdictional reach of the ECOWAS Court, particularly as a means of enhancing access to justice for Community citizens. The institutional failure of national systems has thus led citizens to seek alternatives outside their national judicial systems. The alternatives include resort to courts of other countries and resort to regional courts and tribunals such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. The extent to which these alternatives create viable access to justice opportunities depends on how jurisdiction-regulating rules limit or promote direct access to the courts. In this regard, the ECOWAS Court has declined to apply some of these jurisdictionregulating rules that would restrict citizens' access to the Court.
The main consideration for expanding the rules of access to the Court to include individuals came from a clamour to improve access to justice for individuals at the regional level. This was noted particularly in relation to the utilization of the Court by individuals after the former's initial entry into 99 The Court does not make reference to rules such as res judicata or lis alibi pendens, even where the facts of the case require consideration of the application of such rules; for example, in the Koraou case, supra note 76, the Ugokwe case, supra note 81, and the Keita case, supra note 73. It does not, like the Loewen Tribunal seek to introduce new jurisdiction-regulating rules, such as the rule of judicial finality. 100 Shany notes that, "While Courts situated in a hierarchical relation may interact with one another, they cannot conceivably compete with one another" Shany, supra note 47, p. 6. Therefore, by necessary implication, in the absence of such hierarchy, there is competition.
operation.101 The Court noted that one of the features of an advanced regional integration process was the accessibility of regional courts and tribunals to individuals in order to safeguard the human rights of the latter.102 Therefore, the Court, since the adoption of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol, has ensured that it serves as a mechanism for promoting the right of access to justice for Community citizens, particularly in situations where national justice systems are unable or unwilling to protect this right. While the promotion of access to justice is in itself a positive outcome of this development in regional integration, the expansion of the Court's jurisdiction and rules of access does not come without its own challenges. Some of those challenges are tied to the manner in which the Court translates its relationship with domestic courts. For example, in the absence of strict jurisdiction-regulating rules, there is the concern that there will be multiplicity of proceedings in both systems.
Having multiple proceedings in different systems can indeed lead to multiple problems, including the delivery of conflicting judgments by both courts, which would lead to problems of enforcement and increased tension between institutions at the regional and national level.103 Since the Court does not play a supervisory role in its relation to domestic courts, its decisions do not overrule, nor do they confirm, national court decisions. They both exist on different planes; therefore, in cases involving the same parties, different judgments can create confusion, as can similar judgments, because implementation is based on distinct, independent decisions by different courts.104 The absurdity raised by this situation cannot be underemphasized. In the absence of a longstanding relationship between institutions, based on comity and dialogue, it is difficult to keep track of multiple proceedings and contrasting decisions and respond to them.
In the ECOWAS context, there is little communication between the Court and domestic courts, and one of the challenges faced by the Court is the lack Ojomo African Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2014) 87-122 of awareness in Member States about its activities. While this situation has improved since the establishment and operation of the Court, it still remains a challenge that must be addressed. One of the institutions that can provide considerable assistance in this regard is the ECOWAS Judicial Council, which was established by a Decision of the Authority of Heads of State and Government in 2006.105 The Council comprises the Chief Justices of Member States and is responsible for the appointment and discipline of Judges of the Court. It also provides a balancing mechanism for appointment of Judges, which was left entirely to the Authority of Heads of State and Government under the 1991 Protocol.106 The Council can serve as a mechanism for determining jurisdiction-regulating rules that would eliminate -or at least reduce -the confusion that can be created by the current somewhat unregulated relationship between the Court and Member States, while also preserving the access to justice role of the Court. In addition, by serving as a bridge between national courts and the Court, the Council can also serve as a capacity building mechanism for weak national systems.
In addition to the challenge of multiple proceedings, another challenge that may be faced by the Court is one of capacity. The Court comprises seven judges in a region with a population of more than 300 million people. Considering its role as an alternative promoter of the right of access to justice in a region with weak justice institutions that are unable to guarantee the protection of this right, the Court can expect an increasing number of cases to come before it as the years go by.107 It would be important for the Council and the Authority to explore the option of enhancing and improving the capacity of the Court by increasing the number of Judges and officials of the Court, as well as expanding the reach of the Court by establishing national offices in Member States.
Despite the above caveat, the Court has not been inundated with applications from across the region. Most of the applications that have come to the Court have been brought by Nigerians; this might have something to do with the fact that the Court is located in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, and the significant population of that Country.108 Access to the Court for Community citizens is still a challenge and is more limited than domestic courts in practical and logistical terms, for example, financial and geographical constraints can keep citizens from having access to the Court.109 Nevertheless, the Court provides an alternative judicial system that is functional and devoid of many of the institutional challenges that beset domestic courts. Therefore, relevant actors and stakeholders can begin to pursue relevant policy changes that will address the operational and logistical challenges that continue to keep citizens from accessing the Court.
In conclusion, the Court addresses a very important substantive challenge that has kept Community citizens from accessing justice in their home states. Many of the challenges associated with the structure and performance of the Court can be addressed by introducing policy mechanisms and creating a regulatory mechanism for defining and managing the relationship between the Court and Member State courts.
Conclusion
We have seen, from the above, that there is a need to strengthen judicial and other political institutions in West African States. One of the ways to enhance this process of institution-building is through integration. Regional integration in West Africa has been regarded as a tool for enhancing development by developing regional institutions that can implement policies that meet the demands of citizens on a regional scale. In 2006, ECOWAS transformed its institutions to make itself more accessible to Community citizens, so the focus of the Community shifted from states to individuals or people. This meant that the Community's institutions changed their focus from broad development goals that focused on State institutions to more concise goals targeted at Community citizens. Among the transformations during this period was the transformation of the Community Court of Justice, established pursuant to the 1975 Treaty establishing the Community, empowering it to entertain applications from individuals for the protection of their internationally guaranteed human rights. This modified access to the Court is very wide, such that the Court may serve as a tribunal of first instance in relevant matters, without the requirement that applicants exhaust domestic remedies before approaching the Court. Based on relevant discussions about the relationship between national and international tribunals, this reveals a non-hierarchical relationship, in which the competing competences of the national and international systems provide access to alternate judicial systems, so that the demands and expectations of citizens are met.
This position is not without its challenges and must be regulated in order to address operational challenges arising from multiple proceedings and conflicting judgements, but the jurisprudence of the Court reveals an avid willingness to deliver a public good by ensuring that citizens' rights of access to justice are met by committed judicial institutions. This competition will, hopefully, encourage Member State courts to provide more effective and efficient delivery of justice as a public good to their citizens. The Court will also serve as a capacity-building mechanism for national courts and vice versa, as dialogue encourages continuity and stronger institutional responses at both the national and international level.
